# Russia War Impacts

## Sanctions fail

#### Sanctions fail – oil prices increase profits on limited sales – only diplomatic negotiations end conflict and economic pressures on European and US government

**Kupchan** Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations **2022**

[Charles, “NATO’s Hard Road Ahead The Greatest Threats to Alliance Unity Will Come After the Madrid Summit” Foreign Affairs Magazine June 29, 2022 <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-06-29/natos-hard-road-ahead> gdi-tm]

The West’s sanctions against Moscow, even as they take a toll on the global economy, have so far failed to have the intended effect in Russia. Because of the soaring price of crude, Russia continues to enjoy ample oil revenues. And even though the value of the ruble plunged when Russia launched its invasion in February, it has rebounded and recently hit a seven-year high against the dollar. The United States and its G-7 partners agreed earlier this week to pursue further measures to restrict trade with Russia and also discussed putting a price cap on purchases of Russian oil to ease inflationary pressures and lower Russia’s revenues. The potential impact of these next steps remains uncertain.

Yes, the West must stand by Ukraine, punish Russian expansionism, and defend against further acts of aggression. But it also needs to weigh these priorities against the imperative of preventing illiberal populists from taking power on both sides of the Atlantic. The price of gas in Ohio or Bavaria seems of trivial relevance against the backdrop of Ukraine’s valiant fight for its freedom. But managing the war in Ukraine also means navigating the dangerous shoals of American and European politics. Ukraine would certainly not be the beneficiary should “America first” Republicans come to power in the United States or pro-Moscow populists gain ground in Europe.

It would indeed be cruel irony if NATO succeeds in helping Kyiv thwart Putin’s predatory ambition only to see the Atlantic democracies fall prey to threats from within. Even as they send more howitzers and drones to Ukraine, NATO leaders need to pay close attention to the economic and political blowback from the war on their own societies. When they do so, they will better appreciate the need to facilitate a cease-fire and support Ukraine’s cause at the negotiating table.

Moving from war to negotiations, of course, does not offer a quick fix to the economic dislocations produced by the conflict; sanctions against Russia could well remain in place for quite some time. But diplomacy ultimately offers the only pathway to easing the geopolitical tensions that continue to disrupt energy and food supplies and contribute to inflationary pressures.

## Deterrence CP – Eastern Flank

### Solvency

#### Eastern Flank Adv CP – non-security cooperation/alternative way to solve and clarification about security guarantees reassures Russia and provides protections

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EUROPE’S GRAY ZONE

NATO members will have their hands full dealing with the war in Ukraine, managing fraught relations with Russia, reinforcing the alliance’s eastern flank, and after the fighting ends, participating in post-conflict reconstruction. But they must also begin looking beyond the war and its immediate consequences to draw broader lessons.

The conflict in Ukraine has made clear the need for fresh thinking about advancing security in Europe’s “gray zone,” the lands between NATO and Russia. Even as the war grinds on, a constructive conversation is emerging over Ukraine’s potential geopolitical status moving forward. How this issue evolves may provide a model for Georgia, Moldova, and other countries that have been looking to the West but may not be destined for NATO membership now that Russia has thrown down the gauntlet in Ukraine.

Three intertwined approaches are taking shape to advance the security needs of countries in Europe’s gray zone. First, permanent neutrality offers these states a means of strengthening their sovereignty and independence while taking into consideration Russia’s objections to the further eastward enlargement of NATO. Ukraine embraced neutrality after it separated from the Soviet Union in 1991. It was not until 2019, in response to Russia’s 2014 land grab in Crimea and the Donbas, that Ukraine enshrined in its constitution its intention to join NATO. According to Putin, the prospect of Ukraine’s membership in the alliance played a role in his decision to invade again. In his February 24 address to the nation justifying the “special military operation,” Putin pointed to “the fundamental threats which irresponsible Western politicians created for Russia. . . . I am referring to the eastward expansion of NATO, which is moving its military infrastructure ever closer to the Russian border.” During the early weeks of the war, Kyiv seemed ready to embrace a return to neutrality. Should that outcome emerge as part of a negotiated settlement to the war, Ukraine’s neutrality may serve as model for the region.

Second, neutrality would be accompanied by security assurances from a coalition of willing countries. Such assurances would fall short of the formal defense guarantees that would accompany NATO membership, but they would commit signatories to help maintain the security and nonaligned status of countries in Europe’s gray zone. These arrangements would go beyond previous levels of Western support, likely entailing additional military training and arms transfers during peacetime and robust military support should the states enjoying such assurances face attack. Ukraine again serves as a good model. NATO members are not sending troops to Ukraine to join the fight, but they are providing Ukraine with the wherewithal to defend itself. When the war ends, Ukraine could well find itself in a state of armed neutrality, with ongoing economic and military support from NATO members strengthening its hand in the negotiations over territory that may well follow a cease-fire.

The third plank of security in the gray zone would be membership in the EU. Brussels has already granted Ukraine and Moldova candidate status, while Georgia is in the waiting room. Although accession negotiations can take a decade or perhaps longer, candidate status provides aspirants a political shot in the arm and gives their governments the leverage they need to tackle corruption and implement onerous economic and political reforms—key steps that Ukraine needs to take to extract itself from the oligarchic legacy of its past. EU membership would eventually mark formal institutional inclusion in the community of Atlantic democracies, while avoiding the provocation of Russia that would come with membership in NATO. As Putin put it recently when confronted with the prospect of Ukrainian entry into the EU, “We have nothing against it. It’s their sovereign decision to join economic unions or not. . . . It’s their business, the business of the Ukrainian people.”

In this scenario, NATO would take in Finland and Sweden, and the alliance would eventually integrate aspirants in the Balkans. But it would go no further. Setting a transparent limit on NATO’s eastward enlargement and instead looking to the EU to extend its reach into Europe’s gray zone may finally enable the West and Russia to set aside an issue that has bedeviled their relationship since NATO enlargement began soon after the end of the Cold War. Even if Putin has used NATO expansion as a pretext for his land grabs, greater clarity on NATO’s future could help dampen rivalry between Russia and the West.

## Answer to Answer Blocks

### AT Russia not a threat – poor Ukraine performance

#### Russia poses threat – military capabilities and revanchist threat

**Binnendijk,**  Distinguished Fellow - The Atlantic Council **and Hamilton** Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe**, 2022**

**[**Hans and Daniel, “Strategic Responsibility: Rebalancing European and trans-Atlantic defense” Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strategic-responsibility-rebalancing-european-and-trans-atlantic-defense/> GDI-TM]

Given Russia’s poor initial showing during its 2022 assault on Ukraine, some may believe that Russia is weaker than expected, that its strength will be sapped by the war, and that stronger European defense is therefore not needed. This would be a dangerous conclusion. Despite Moscow’s missteps, the Russian military will be able to reconstitute its losses quickly and learn from its mistakes. Russian military capabilities remain formidable, and Moscow has demonstrated repeatedly its intent not only to intervene militarily in other countries but to weaponize food, energy, digital, and other flows connecting it to various countries. Russia’s ongoing revanchist threat, and the more robust forward presence of allied forces being prepared for approval at NATO’s June 29-30 Madrid summit, will place increasing demands on all allies for high-readiness forces. This will add to the urgency of European allies assuming a greater share of the burden across the board — greater numbers of forces, higher readiness, and enhanced mobility, all with critical enablers.

# Nuclear war Impacts

### Nuclear war bad – laundry list

#### Impact – nuclear war causes little ice age that spreads globally and for centuries – crop failure, marine death that collapse oceans creating marine famine

**WILKINS**, staff writer for Common Dreams, **2022**

(BRETT, "Model Shows Nuclear War Would Cause Millennia-Long 'Little Ice Age'," Common Dreams, July 8, 2022, https://www.commondreams.org/news/2022/07/08/model-shows-nuclear-war-would-cause-millennia-long-little-ice-age, accessed 7/10/2022, gdi-tmur)

As Russia's invasion of Ukraine revives the terrifying specter of thermonuclear annihilation, a scientific study published Thursday revealed that a nuclear exchange involving as few as hundreds of warheads would likely cause a "little ice age" lasting centuries or even millennia.

Scientists have long known that even a "limited" thermonuclear war could result in a so-called nuclear winter, or prolonged global cooling resulting from atmospheric soot blocking life-sustaining sunlight. However, the new study examines the effects of such warfare on the Earth's oceans and marine ecosystems.

Researchers simulated two hypothetical nuclear wars: a U.S.-Russia thermonuclear exchange in which 4,400 100-kiloton warheads were launched against cities and industrial targets, sparking conflagrations that spewed more than 330 billion pounds of smoke and sunlight-absorbing black carbon into the Earth's upper atmosphere, and an India-Pakistan conflict involving 500 100-kiloton bombs that produced up to 103 billion pounds of smoke.

In all of the researchers' simulations, nuclear firestorms spewed soot and smoke into the upper atmosphere, blocking out the sun and resulting in global crop failure. In the first month after the war, average global temperatures plunged by about 13°F, a larger temperature change than during the last ice age.

"It doesn't matter who is bombing whom. It can be India and Pakistan or NATO and Russia. Once the smoke is released into the upper atmosphere, it spreads globally and affects everyone," Louisiana State University professor Cheryl Harrison, the study's lead author, explained.

The researchers found that ocean temperatures would quickly and irreversibly plummet, with spreading sea ice causing catastrophic coastal blockages that would render shipping impossible in much of the world.

In an even more ominous development, "the sudden drop in light and ocean temperatures, especially from the Arctic to the North Atlantic and North Pacific oceans, would kill the marine algae, which is the foundation of the marine food web, essentially creating a famine in the ocean," a summary of the report published in Science Daily stated. "This would halt most fishing and aquaculture."

Study co-author Alan Robock, a professor of environmental sciences at Rutgers University in New Jersey, said that "nuclear warfare results in dire consequences for everyone."

"World leaders have used our studies previously as an impetus to end the nuclear arms race in the 1980s, and five years ago to pass a treaty in the United Nations to ban nuclear weapons," he added. "We hope that this new study will encourage more nations to ratify the ban treaty."

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has been ratified by 65 nations—but none of the world's nine nuclear powers. Commenting after last month's first meeting of state parties to the TPNW in Vienna, disarmament campaigner Alice Slater told InDepthNews that "the dark clouds of war and strife continue to plague the world."

### Nuclear war bad – marine food chains

#### Nuclear war causes little ice age and collapses marine food chains and fishing stocks – adaptation limited possibility

**Harrison et al.**, assisstant prof at LSU, **2022**

(Cheryl S., "A New Ocean State After Nuclear War," AGU Advances, Volume3, Issue 4, e2021AV000610, August 2022, https://doi.org/10.1029/2021AV000610, accessed 7/10/2022)

\*NPP = net primary production

\*hysteresis = phenomenon in which the value of a physical property lags behind changes in the effect causing it,

For Arctic sea ice, the hysteresis does not just result in a long transient but is likely a new steady state for many nuclear cooling scenarios, as in historical global cooling events. While only the US-Russia scenario was simulated long enough to achieve a steady sea-ice state, it is likely that sea ice volume would remain elevated in the four nuclear war simulations above 5 Tg, given their elevated state at the end of the cooling event (Figure  5). Similar elevated sea ice events are observed in the paleoclimate record after volcanic cooling events. For example, strong evidence supports that an expanded Arctic sea ice state during the Little Ice Age (LIA) was triggered by volcanic forcing within the range of the scenarios here. Decadal scale cooling, driven by tropical volcanic eruptions, has been simulated to induce an albedo feedback (Perovich & Polashenski, 2012) that causes centennial scale increases in Arctic sea ice during the LIA (Zhong et al., 2011), a finding supported by a range of proxy records across the Arctic (Miller et al., 2012). Climate proxy records (Sigl et al., 2015) indicate that the reduction in solar forcing of the largest pre-LIA volcanic eruption was 35 W/m2 , a small fraction of the 120 W/m2 reduction in our US-Russia nuclear winter simulation, and similar to the 16 Tg India-Pakistan case (Coupe et al., 2021). Thus, both the short-term and persistent expanded sea ice seen in simulations of nuclear war driven cooling is consistent with historical evidence. We conclude that a large nuclear war would likely induce a nuclear little ice age and be more likely to induce such an event than a volcanic eruption with the same radiation anomaly, due to the shorter lifetime of volcanic aerosols and thus briefer cooling duration (Robock, 2000). Anthropogenic climate change, which was not simulated here, would mitigate some cooling and the resulting ice expansion (Bethke et al., 2017). However, for a large nuclear war anthropogenic CO2 emissions would likely plummet, eventually slowing or even reversing global warming (Matthews & Weaver, 2010; Robock, 2015).

How would the immediate and long-term impacts of nuclear cooling affect marine ecosystems and fisheries? The large and rapid changes in marine primary production, temperature and other physical conditions would result in declines in marine consumers like fish, shellfish and larger bodied animals, both warm and cold blooded (Guiet et al., 2016; Heneghan et al., 2021; Jennings et al., 2008; Schwartz, 1978). The overall abundance of consumers (i.e., fish) and the presence of large-bodied species is directly related to the magnitude of primary production (e.g., Guiet et  al.,  2016; Jennings et  al.,  2008), especially for non-mobile species (Watson et  al.,  2015), and lower ocean temperatures slow the growth rates of fish (Brown et al., 2004). Our recent modeling using a global fisheries model forced by these simulations found that global fish biomass would decline by ∼20% over the first 10 years after the US-Russia war scenario, proportional to declines in primary production, but also depending strongly on response of fishing pressure after the war (Scherrer et al., 2020). These estimates have high uncertainty (Scherrer et al., 2020), as the fisheries model assumes immediate adaptation of marine communities to rapid climate velocities, and does not resolve species level processes such as how changes in plankton bloom timing would affect feeding and reproduction success of zooplankton and fish, or how light reductions affect visual hunting (Aksnes et al., 2004; Cahill et al., 2013; Durant et al., 2007; Pinsky et al., 2020).

Given the large uncertainties and limited modeling performed for marine consumers, it is highly uncertain what the upper trophic level communities would look like in the new ocean state. Global marine ecosystem models generally simulate functional groups or fish size spectra and not individual species (Heneghan et al., 2021), and the explicit links between the changes in the composition of phytoplankton, zooplankton and fish communities need to be investigated further. While there is evidence that some pelagic fish species rapidly shifted geographic range and adapted to the climatic perturbation following the Tambora volcanic eruption (Alexander et al., 2017), we underline that most of the war scenarios modeled here cause much larger and more sustained climate anomalies. Temperature impacts from nuclear war are particularly extreme in coastal regions where the majority of fish catch and marine ecosystem services are provided (Figure 3c). Benthic and sessile marine organisms in coastal zones would be particularly vulnerable to the locally extreme temperature and NPP shifts (Figures 2 and 6). The long-term thermal tolerance of many species and life history stages would likely be exceeded by the velocity, magnitude and duration of the nuclear war driven climate event, leading to decreased fitness and increased mortality (Peck et al., 2009; Rezende et al., 2011). Thus, the strong declines in temperature and primary productivity projected in many of the nuclear war scenarios could lead to collapses of marine food-chains and potentially extinctions of some endemic marine consumers. The timescale of recovery to such disturbances is unclear.

### 1nc/2ac – nuke war – oceans

#### Nuclear war massively alters ocean ecosystems – even if improves nutrients in one area, overall impact on ice sheets and stocks harmful

**Harrison et al.**, assisstant prof at LSU, **2022**

(Cheryl S., "A New Ocean State After Nuclear War," AGU Advances, Volume3, Issue 4, e2021AV000610, August 2022, https://doi.org/10.1029/2021AV000610, accessed 7/10/2022)

\*hysteresis = property of a system that has a response that “lags behind” the forcing variable, meaning that the system depends on the history of the forcing, either resulting in a new state when forcing is removed, or slowly returns to the initial state

\*NPP = net primary production

Following each of the nuclear war scenarios, a decadal solar radiation reduction and cooling event ensues. The low light and rapid, sustained cooling cause large physical perturbations to the ocean, including an intensification of vertical mixing, enhanced overturning and expansion of sea ice. In all nuclear war scenarios, these perturbations drive a hysteresis, generating a new ocean state, where density stratification and biogeochemical tracers are altered throughout the water column. The magnitude of the new state and timescale of recovery are affected by the magnitude of the cooling anomaly and depend on the system effected. In all nuclear war scenarios, modifications to temperature and biogeochemical profiles persist for many decades, and likely hundreds of years, owing to the long recovery timescales of the deep ocean. Increased Arctic sea ice extent and volume are likely permanent in US-Russia (150 Tg) war simulation, as in the case of the volcanic cooling driven initiation of the Little Ice Age at the end of the thirteenth Century CE. Increased macronutrient availability, driven by changes in biogeochemical profiles, boosts marine productivity in the tropics and subtropics during nuclear cooling, and even more once nuclear cooling ends. However, increased iron limitation at high latitudes due to an altered phytoplankton community results in no enhancement of production there, despite the higher nitrate. Enhanced tropical productivity in the US-Russia scenario leads to an increase in global NPP that persists for decades. These results indicate major changes in ocean ecosystems after a global cooling event, both from the nuclear cooling event itself, but also from long-term changes to the marine physical and biogeochemical system. These findings expand our understanding of how both historical and potential future global cooling events impact ocean physics, biogeochemistry, and ecosystems.